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Abstract 
Using an agency framework, this study examines how executive transitions very according to the nature of the 
relationship between agent and principal, tirm performance, and the executive's relative power. Using the entire 
population of Spanish newspapers during the period 1966-1993, we tind that declining performance is a 
precursor of executive changes, but that the impact is much greater for the second person in command. This 
suggests that entrenchment allows the top executive to be relatively insulated from firm performance, yet hold 
his/her subordinate accountable for that performance. We also find, contrary to an "scapegoat" or population 
ecology prediction, that executive changes have a positive impact on firm survival, and that the salutary 
organizational effect of managerial transitions is greatest for the top executive. 
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Neoclassical economic theory focused on the entrepreneur as the decision maker for 
the firm. The interests of this individual were assumed to be isomorphic with those of the 
business, thus that his/her decisions were driven by the desire to maximize firm performance 
subject to market constraints. While this simplifying assumption made it possible to develop 
elegant economic models leading to deterministic predictions based on the concept of 
equilibrium (for instance, the product price would be set at a point where it equals marginal 
revenue product), it limited our understanding of the behavior of hired managers whose 
interests may not be synonymous with those of the firm's owner. Starting with early works by 
Berle and Means (1932) and Coase (1937), the theory of agency emerged to fill this gap in 
neoclassical economics by focusing on those situations that involve delegation of duties to an 
individual (agent) who is expected to act in the best interest of the party (principal) paying for 
the agent's services. 
Any agency relationship raises the possibility of opportunistic actions on the part of the 
agent; the agent may have different objectives than the principal and thus be tempted to pursue 
his or her own self-serving agenda. In the parlance of agency theory, agents are tempted by a 
"moral hazard" that may lead them to take advantage of the principal. This is more likely to 
occur when the tasks performed by the agent on behalf of the principal are 
"nonprogrammable" (i.e., difficult to structure) and "information intensive" (i.e., require highly 
specialized skills and knowledge to carry them out). Nonprogrammability and information 
asymmetries give the agents more autonomy and discretion, which they may use to pursue 
their own ends (Gomez-Mejia & Balkin, 1992). 
The appointment of managers by firm owners to run the business represents a 
prototypical case of such a relationship. First, it is not feasible for absentee owners to 
structure and closely supervise the activities of top executives. Second, executives as agents 
know far more about organizational processes and the appropriateness of business decisions 
than absentee owners so that information asymmetries are likely to be present between the 
parties. Lastly, executives are in a position to utilize organizational resources to pursue 
objectives that may not be compatible with the best interest of owners (e.g., entrench 
themselves so that they can't be easily removed when finn performance is poor). 
In other words, the principal may incur some losses whenever the agent pursues 
objectives that are incongruent with those of the principal. These agency costs may go 
undetected to the extent that information asymmetries are present (i.e., the agent has more 
knowledge about the task at hand than the principal) and it is difficult for the principal to 
program and observe the agent's actions. In the jargon of agency theory, moral hazard tempts 
agents to take advantage of their privileged position, producing agency costs for the principal. 
These agency costs may be reduced in two ways: (a) the establishment of incentives 
that reward the agent for outcomes of importance to principals such as profitability (generally 
referred to as "incentive alignment" for shOl1) and (b) the development of a system for 
monitoring the behavior and decisions of agents to ensure that these don't deviate from the 
interest of owners. 
Most of the conceptual and empirical literature on agency theory has been 
circumscribed to incentive alignment, that is, the use of financial rewards as a mechanism to 
maximize the joint utility curves of the agent and principal so that their interests become 
intertwined. The rationale for this emphasis has been that in the absence of good information 
about the activities or behaviors of the agent, incentive alignment becomes the most viable 
control mechanism to reduce agency costs (Eisenhardt, 1989). Because it is diflicult if not 
impossible to effectively monitor executive's behavior and decisions, given 
nonprogrammability of tasks and extensive information asymmetries, principals must rely on 
incentive alignment so that rewards linked to performance outcomes engender "self-
monitoring" on the part of the executive. 
Following the above logic, more than 300 empirical studies have examined the 
relationship between executive pay and firm performance (Gomez-Mejia, 1994). As a whole, 
this literature shows that, at best, incentive alignment is a weak mechanism of control for top 
executives. Typically the percent of variance in executive pay attributed to firm performance 
is under 10% and seldom exceeds 15%. A recent meta analysis of executive compensation 
studies published during the last fifty years by Tosi, Werner, Katz, and Gomez-Mejia (1996) 
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found that firm performance and changes in firm performance explain 5% and 4% of the 
variation of CEO compensation and CEO pay adjustments, respectively. 
Given the weak results for incentive alignment, this leaves open the possibility that 
monitoring may play an important role as a control mechanism. One way to test this notion is 
to ascertain iffirm performance is a precursor to executive turnover. While minuscule in 
comparison to the large number of studies on incentive alignment, the literature appears to 
support this linkage. It suggests that top management turnover generally follows periods of 
poor organizational performance (e.g., Friedman & Singh, 1989; Coughlan & Schmidt, 1985; 
Weisbach, 1988) even though "the magnitude of this performance/turnover relationship is not 
always strong" (Walsh &Seward, 1990). 
This paper empirically addresses several important issues that are still poorly 
understood on the causes and consequences of managerial exits in relation to firm 
performance. First, little is known about how interpersonal relations or the presence of a 
psychological contract (vis-it-vis a more formal contract) between agent and principal 
influences the employment security of the agent when firm performance declines. Second, the 
literature on the organizational consequences of executive terminations has provided mixed 
results, so that we still have much to learn as to whether or not dismissal of the agent is 
beneficial to the firm (Haveman, 1993). Third, little is known about the cumulative effects of 
executive changes overtime on organizational survival. Lastly, while there is an extensive 
literature on executive entrenchment to neutralize monitoring mechanisms, the extent to which 
agent entrenchment increases as the probability of organizational failure increases remains to 
be examined (Walsh & Seward, 1990). Each of these issues will be discussed next, leading to 
a set of hypotheses to be tested empirically on the entire population of Spanish newspapers 
during the period 1966-1993. 
Monitoring, Relational Properties, and Agent Sanctions 
An issue that has received little attention in the agency literature but that is especially 
relevant to monitoring and its consequences concerns the existence of a "relational contract" 
(MacNeil, 1978) between the agent and the principals. Relational contracts differ from 
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traditional economic transactions in several ways. First, interaction between agent and 
principal creates utility for the relationship itself that goes beyond the exchange value of the 
transaction. Second, experience in the contractual relationship creates mutual expectations for 
future interaction such that both parties tend to view the horizon of the relationship as 
indefinite and thus increase their commitment to relationship. Third, experience and the 
indefinite horizon enhances mutual trust. The development of trust promotes compromise and 
resolution over disagreements about performance that may result from unforeseen 
circumstances. The principal willingly delays complete specification of performance for the 
agent and judge compliance in the light of circumstances at that times. That is, what is to be 
done, how and when is less precisely specified and often changes over the life of the contract 
with changes in conditions. In normal economic contracting arrangements, assumptions of 
self-interest dictate that performance be precisely specified at the time of negotiation and is 
subsequently judged exclusively against that criteria. Research by Zaheer and Venkatraman 
(1995) sUpp0l1 the role of trust in economic relations. In their examination of the governance 
structure between insurance agents and commercial clients, they found that trust explained the 
structural form of the inter-organizational relationship even after controlling for economic 
factors. 
The presence of relational governance properties (such as trust) in economic 
exchanges adds another element to principal-agent contracts that a focus on economic aspects 
alone may miss (Granovetter, 1985; Buckholtz, Schulze, & Dino, 1996). An analogous 
concept in the organizational behavior literature is that of the psychological contract (Tosi, 
Rizzo, & Carroll, 1996), referring to an underlying non-formal agreement regulating the 
behavior of two pal1ies to a relationship, which creates a common bond and a set of mutual 
expectations. 
Close interpersonal interactions between agents and principal would seem to 
encourage the development of relatiollal govel"Jl(fllc:e elements. As a result, both parties may 
attach value to the "relationship" that goes beyond the purely economic value created by 
transaction. These factors may influence the longevity of the contract (agents may be allowed 
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to stay beyond their useful contribution to the organization), as well as insulate the agent from 
negative performance attributions in spite of poor organizational outcomes. 
In other words, a relational contract between the agent and the principal relaxes the 
need for clear performance criteria and increases the expectation that evaluation of 
performance will be "fair" and reflect the changing conditions surrounding the contract. Thus, 
the presence of relational governance may also influence specification and enforcement of 
contract completion such that assessment of performance under relational norms implicitly 
recognizes extenuating circumstances arising between the time of contract negotiation and 
completion, and may even alter the definition of performance ex post in the light of those 
circumstances. Acknowledging the existence of relational governance provides an 
explanation for the inconsistent intel1emporal association between firm performance and agent 
tenure. Thus: 
Hypothesis 1: The greater the relational properties of principal-agent controls the less 
likely that agents will be dismissed in response to negative performance results. 
Agent Dismissal and Performance Consequences 
The question of whether or not managerial succession affects firm performance 
"continues to intrigue organizational scholars because the empirical findings are inconsistent" 
(Haveman, 1993: 864). Carroll (1984) found that the dismissal of newspapers' editors 
augmented the m0l1ality rates of these finns. In a separate industry, Singh, House and Tucker 
(1986) found the opposite results, revealing that the survival rates of voluntary service 
organizations improved in response to CEO successions. More recently, using a sample of 
small telephone companies in Southeasten Iowa at the beginning of the century, Havenman 
(1993) corroborated Carroll's findings in that succession precipitated organizational mortality. 
Haveman (1993: 867) concluded that "clearly, the limited and conflicting evidence researchers 
have to date suggests that the relations between managerial succession and organizational 
mortality needs further investigation". 
At a conceptual level, we also find inconsistent theoretical predictions of the impact of 
executive changes on subsequent mortality rates. Agency theory argues that senior managers 
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are dismissed when the board responsible to monitor their behavior has decided that they are 
incompetent or lag behind the skills and abilities of their counterparts in competing firms. In 
other words, agent dismissal is an integral part of internal monitoring mechanisms to discipline 
managers when firm performance is in jeopardy (Walsh & Seward, 1990). As lames and 
Sorey (1981: 16) argued in their discussion of managerial exit, "dismissal is the ultimate 
sanction which conditions their [manager's] behavior." Other things equal, by dismissing top 
managers who are deemed to be ineffective and replacing them with successors who 
presumably have more talent, organizational performance should improve. 
An alternative prediction is that organizations make negative performance attibutions 
to top management even though observed firm performance outcomes may be the result of 
exogenous forces that may be unrelated to managerial competence. In other words, 
executives are used as scapegoats, and changes at the top are largely ritualistic or symbolic to 
convey to employees and stockholders that poor performance will not be tolerated (Gamson & 
Scott, 1964; Brown, 1982). Therefore, if managerial sucession is merely a symbolic issue, 
dismissal should not affect firm performance. 
A more extreme view is found among population ecologists who argue that managerial 
succession will diminish performance and increase the rate of failure, particularly for smaller 
organizations with fewer slack resources. According to population ecologists this is likely to 
happen for two reasons. First, changes at the top disrupts worker routines, creates uncertainty 
and confusion, interrupts chain of command, and decreases morale by making employees feel 
less secure (Alien, Pamian, & Lotz, 1979; Can-oil, 1984; Gou1dner, 1954). Grusky (1963) 
coined the label "the succession-crisis hypothesis" to denote a vicious circle whereby poor 
performance precipitates managerial dismissal which in turn accelerates performance decline 
and increases organizationalmol1ality rates. Second, the departing managers take with them a 
great deal of knowledge about the firm and its external relations. This knowledge takes a long 
time to acquire by a replacement. As a result, dismissal and substitution of top executives 
provides a dysfunctional "Iiability-of-newness" (Amburgey, Kelly, & Barnett, 1993; Carroll, 
1984; Freeman, Carroll, & Hannan, 1983; Singh et ai., 1986). Haveman (1993: 867) 
summarizes this succession "liability" as follows: 
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New managers will bring with them new modes of action and new priorities that must 
be learned and routinized. In addition to changes in internal operations, managerial 
succession entails shifts in relations with a company's external environment. Top 
managers play important boundary spanning roles. Therefore, succession at the top 
disrupts external relations with suppliers, clients, and local communities. During the 
adjustment period that follows succession, organizational performance will be more 
variable and failure rates will be higher. 
Given prior conflicting results, and inconsistent theoretical predictions, we wiII 
reexamine the effect of agent changes on organizational performance, measured in terms of 
subsequent mortality rates. The three theoretical predictions discussed above will be 
contrasted empirically: 
Hypothesis 2a: Managerial succession will have a positive effect on organizational 
survival (agency prediction) 
Hypothesis 2b: Managerial succession will have no effect on organizational survival 
(scapegoat prediction) 
Hypothesis 2c: Managerial succession will increase organizational mortality 
(population ecology prediction). 
Managerial Entr·enchment 
The literature on agency theory, particularly in the management field, recognizes that 
executives will try to neutralize internal control mechanisms to ensure self-preservation. This 
may result in executives holding their jobs past the point where their stay is beneficial to 
owners, a process called "entrenchment" which is another form of moral hazard (Fredrikson, 
Hambrick, & Baumrin, 1988; Herman, 1981; Kimberly & Zajac, 1988; Mace, 1971; Pfeffer, 
1972; Vance, 1983). In a review of this literature, Walsh and Seward (1990: 430) conclude 
that: 
Top managers are welI aware of their precarious employment situations. Consistent 
with the evidence in the turnover literature, they know that they are at risk of being 
dismissed for sub-optimal performance ... valuing their position, many executives work 
to ensure their own security. Toward that end, they have no choice but to tamper with 
the board's ability to monitor and control their performance. 
Walsh and Seward (1990) discuss in great detail many agent entrenchment approaches, 
including among others, hiding or obscuring negative attributes, hiring consultants to 
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legitimize decisions, convincing the board to recognize the primacy of environmental 
determinism, manipulating or biasing information, and making themselves nonsubstitutable by 
embarking on a business strategy that capitalizes on their idiosyncratic skills and abilities. 
If an increase in the probability of organizational failure augments the probability of 
executive dismissal (see hypothesis 1) this means that managerial entrenchment would tend to 
increase accordingly to prevent or delay termination. Therefore, as the probability of business 
failure increases, the tenure of the executive will decrease at a lower rate. In other words, 
managerial entrenchment will attenuate the strength of this relationship as employment 
insecurity rises. Similarly, following the arguments of hypothesis 1, when the ties between the 
executive and the finn are of a relational nature, the executive will have a greater likelihood of 
successfully engaging in managerial entrenchment practices. The next hypotheses follows from 
this logic: 
Hypothesis 3a: The relationship between executive tenure and a firm's probability of 
death will be asymtotic, with the former decreasing at a lower rate than the latter. 
Hypothesis 3b: The tenure of an executive under a relational contract will be higher 
regardless of a firm's probability of death. 
METHODS 
Research Setting and Data 
The entire newspaper industry of Spain was used as the population of firms for the 
study, covering all the daily newspapers published in Spain during the period 1966-1993. The 
data base, consisting of 276 newspapers, was created by pulling information from three 
separate sources. The first source is the Registry of Newspapers ("Registro de Empresas 
Periodisticas"). This registry was legally mandated for all newspapers published in Spain, 
starting on March 18, 1966. It required extensive information on each publisher, including the 
title, the founders, number of pages, location, target audience, etc. The second source is the 
Newspaper Guide (Guia de Medios), which contains detailed demographic data on each firm, 
including when it was founded, when it ceased operations (if applicable), and the exact date 
for any succession event of the top executive or director. The last source is an ongoing report 
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produced by an independent newspaper association ("Oficina de Justificacion de la Difusion") 
which shows the total number of newspapers that are produced and sold by the firm. 
These organizations differed substantially from the type of firms generally studied by 
agency scholars: Spanish newspapers are very different from large, modern, corporate U. S. 
based entities that are normally examined in the governance literature. The idiosyncracies of 
this population are valuable in assessing the generalizability of agency theory to examine the 
sensitivity of executive tenure to firm performance and the consequences of agent removal. 
Thus, a distinct advantage of the data base used here is its novelty by providing an opportunity 
to study principal-agent relations in a rather unique international context. 
Openltionalization of the variahles 
Organizational Age at the Time of Faihlloe: The age of each newspaper was 
calculated as the difference between the founding date and the date it ceased to exist. If the 
firm continued to exist as of 1993, it was treated as censured data (see Carroll, 1984, for a 
discussion of this issue). This variable was used to test hypothesis 2 because it allowed us to 
examine the length of survival of the organization as a function of executive successions. 
Performance: Financial earnings data was not available for the population offirms 
used in the study and very few of these firms were publicly traded. Therefore, we had to 
develop a proxy for performance based on the probability of failure. This was calculated as the 
ratio of the variance of volume of newspapers sold (circulation) divided by a term consisting 
of the average circulation minus the minimum circulation squared. To the extent that the 
average circulation for a given period exceeds the minimum circulation, the term in the 
denominator increases and the probability offailure decreases accordingly. The ratio was 
subjected to a logarithmic transformation since the distribution that best fit the data is 
lognormal in nature. This ratio was calculated separately for the period corresponding to the 
tenure of each executive. 
Executive Tenure: This information was obtained for the top two executives. It 
measured the length of time transpired between date of hire and date of termination (if 
replaced) or 1993 (if still on the job) in which case it was treated as censured data (Lawless, 
9 
1982; Cox & Daves, 1984). The "gerente" (Chief Executive Officer, CEO) is almost always 
part of the extended family that owns the newspaper, or someone who is close to the family. 
This individual reports to the Board of Directors, and is responsible for all strategic and 
financial affairs of the business. The "director" (editor), on the other hand, is a professional 
journalist responsible for routine procedural matters, technical issues, implementation of the 
strategies traced by the CEO and the board (e.g., compliance with ideological orientation), 
content of the newspaper, and staff supervision. 
These two executives were used as proxies to operationalize hypothesis 1. Because of 
the close ties of the CEO to the principal, the ongoing interaction between them, and the 
greater knowledge that the principal possesses about the agent, the control of the CEO by 
the principal would falI under the realm of a relational contract. The editor, however, is 
explicitly hired to perform a job for a fee and the information available about the character, 
motivation, and abilities of this individual is more limited than that available for the CEO. In 
the absence of better information, organizational performance attributions are more likely to 
be made to the behavior of the agent. In other words, the editor is more likely to be blamed 
for poor performance results. Therefore, folIowing the logic of hypothesis 1, the relation 
between the editor and principal would tend to be confined to the exchange value of the 
transaction so that the director's tenure would be more closely tied to observed performance 
outcomes than the tenure of the "gerente" or top executive. 
Managerial Succession: Two sets of dummy variables measured the exits of the CEO 
and the editor. We set each dummy variable equal to one during the period between the ith 
and (i + 1 )th succession event and equal to zero otherwise. In addition, we calculated the total 
number of successions for the CEO and the editor during the entire period the newspaper 
was in business. Two sets of dummy variables were created to measure the effect of 
managerial succession on organizational survival, one set for the CEO and one for the editor. 
We coded each dummy variable as one if the firm has had ith successions and zero otherwise. 
As can be seen in Table 6 and discussed in the analysis section, we examined each succession 
separately up to four since this number encompasses the vast majority of exits per firm. At the 
same time, we created a dummy variable if the number of exits exceeded four. Lastly, we 
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created a discrete variable that measures the total number of succession events experienced by 
the firm. This total was subjected to a logarithmic transformation since the distribution that 
best fits the data is logarithmic in nature. 
Control variables: Several control variables were included in the study that may 
influence both the performance measure and mortality rates. A dummy variable controlled for 
sampling bias since 119 of the firms were born before the observation period began in 1966 
(Cox & Oakes, 1984). If this was the case, the firm was coded as" I" and "0" otherwise. 
Competitive conditions was controlled with a variable for density (Singh et aI., 1986) or the 
number of newspapers operating in a given year. If the newspaper owned the printing press 
used, it was coded as "I" and "0" otherwise. Capital structure was represented by a variable 
that equaled one if a firm issued stock to raise capital and zero otherwise (Haveman, 1993). 
Since Spain was under a totalitarian regime from 1939 to 1975 (under Generalisimo Francisco 
Franco), and some newspapers were subsidized by the state's political pal1y ("El 
Movimiento"), a dummy variable was created to account for this with" I" designating party 
subsidy and "0" if the newspaper received no political funding. The age of the firm at the time 
of executive succession was also included in the equations to control for the liability of 
newness effect. 
Finally, we included a family tie control variable in the analysis concerning the editor's 
tenure. If the editor and the CEO are members of the same family, it was coded as "I" and 
"0" otherwise. This enabled us to partial out the newspaper performance effect on the tenure 
of the editor that may be attributed to this person's family relations with the immediate 
supervisor (i.e., CEO). To this end, an interaction term was created as "performance x family 
tie CEO-agent" and entered in the equation to predict editor tenure. 
Analvsis 
The hypotheses were tested using lifetime data models with right censored 
observations (Lawless, 1982: 31). For hypothesis I, two models were calculated, one 
predicting tenure of the CEO and one predicting tenure of the editor. The independent variable 
in both cases was firm performance. The control variables are the ones described earlier, 
namely a dummy code for finns born before 1966, density, ownership of printing press, 
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capital structure, and party subsidy. In the editor equation, as noted above, a family tie 
measure was also included as a control variable as well as an interaction term "performance x 
family tie." A likelihood ratio statistics was calculated to determine if the coefficient for firm 
performance as an independent variable and agent tenure as a dependent variable was larger 
for the editor than for the CEO (which would support hypothesis 1 since this would indicate 
that tenure is more sensitive to firm performance for editors than CEOs). 
Hypotheses 2a to 2c were tested by calculating two sets of models, one for the CEO 
and one for the editor. First, for each individual succession event as an independent variable, 
organizational survival up to the next succession event (if any) was used as a dependent 
variable. This indicates whether or not organizational failure occurred following each 
succession event. In a second set of models (one for the CEO and one for the editor), the 
total number of succession events during the life of the newspaper was entered as an 
independent variable and organizational survival was used as a dependent variable, partialling 
out the control variables noted earlier. 
Hypothesis 2a (agency prediction) would be supported if the coefficient for the 
succession measure (either individually or cumulative) is positive and statistically significant, 
indicating that agent changes have a salutary effect on organizational survival. Hypothesis 2b 
(scapegoat prediction) would be supported if the regression coefficients for the succession 
measures fail to reach statistical significance. Lastly, Hypothesis 2c (population ecology 
prediction) would be supported if the coefficients for managerial succession are negative and 
statistically significant, indicating that executive changes would tend to precipitate 
organizational mortality. 
We also tested the type of statistical distribution most appropriate to examine the 
relation between executive exit and firm failure (Levinthal, 199 I). The model that best fit the 
data for the correlation between executive transitions and organizational survival is lognormal 
after comparing it with loglogistic, Weibull, and Gompel1z distributions. Therefore, the 
lognormal transformation was chosen. 
Hypothesis 3a will be tested by examining whether or not executive tenure decreases at 
a lower pace as the firm's probability offailure increases. This hypothesis would be supported 
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if the observed relationship between executive tenure and the firm's probability offailure is 
convex in nature. Similarly, foIlowing the logic of the third hypothesis, while the relationship 
between executive tenure and the firm's probability of failure should be asymtotic in nature for 
both the CEO and the editor (hypothesis 3a), at any given point of the probability offailure 
distribution the tenure of the CEO will be higher than that of the editor (indicating greater 
entrenchment power for the former, as per hypothesis 3b). 
RESULTS 
Table 1 presents descriptive population statistics and Table 2 shows the fioequency of 
successions. As can be seen in Table 2, there were 609 CEO successions and 899 editor 
successions, with the majority offirms having four or less CEO changes (553 or 91%) and six 
or less director changes (826 or 92%). The maximum number of successions experienced by 
any newspaper during the observation period was eight CEO exits and eleven editor exits. 
Table 3 and 4 presents means, standard deviations, and bivariate correlations for all variables. 
Table 5 shows the event analysis results with tenure of the CEO (column I) and the 
editor (columns 2 and 3) as dependent variables. The observed performance coefticient is 
negative and statisticaIly significant for all models, indicating that executives are more likely to 
be terminated when performance declines. However, as argued by hypothesis 1, the 
magnitude of the performance effect is much greater for the editor (column 2), even after 
controlling for family ties between the CEO and the editor (column 3). The differences 
between the performance coefficients between columns I and 2, and columns 1 and 3, are 
statistically significant at p:S .0001 using the likelihood ratio statistic test, supporting 
hypothesis 1. 
Table 6 presents the model results with organizational survival as the dependent 
variable and each succession event as an independent variable, partial ling out the control 
variables. Only four successions are shown in Table 6 for the CEO (which includes 91% of the 
exits) and four for the director (which includes 86% of the exits) since this sufficiently covers 
most of the cases. Columns 1-4 in Table 6 presents the model results for the CEO, while 
columns 5-8 present the model results for the editor. As can be seen in column 1, the total 
number of CEO successions is highly related to organizational survival (p:S .0001), although 
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the statistical significance of this coefficient drops considerably when all the control variables 
are included in the equation (p::: . 10, as shown in column 2). These findings are mirrored 
when we examine the impact of each unique CEO succession event as a dummy variable. As 
can be seen in column 3, the coefficients for the CEO dummy succession variables are all 
statistically significant at p::: .0001, yet it appears that the marginal gain of executive 
transitions in terms of organizational survival decreases as the number of successions 
increases. Incorporating the control variables in the equations (column 4) reduces the 
magnitude of the individual CEO sllccession coefficients, yet most remain as statistically 
significant at p::: .05. 
The pattern is similar when we examine the editor equations (columns 6-8), although 
the magnitude of the coefficients tend to be greater for the CEO. As can be seen in column 1 
(which does not include control variables) and column 2 (which includes control variables) the 
total number of editor succession events shows a highly significant association with 
organizational survival (p::: .000 I). Similarly, each unique editor succession event has an 
independent positive impact on survival (at least at p::: .00 I as seen in column 3), with most of 
the succession events remaining as statistically significant after the control variables are 
included in the equation. 
The results in Table 6 strongly support the agency interpretation (hypothesis 2a) in that 
changes at the top of the newspapers are associated with improved organizational survival. In 
other words, when a firm replaces a top executive it has reasons to suspect that a change in 
stewardship can help enhance organizational survival and more often than not this suspicion 
turns out to be true. Therefore, the overall impact of the change is not merely cosmetic or 
symbolic (scapegoat effect) nor deleterious to the firm ( as argued by population ecologists). 
To determine if the tenure of the CEO is greater at any given point of the probability 
of failure continuum (hypothesis 3 b), a separate analysis was conducted for the CEO and the 
editor with agent tenure along the vel1ical axis and the firm's probability offailure along the 
horizontal axis. The graphical depiction of the relationship between exit events and 
organizational survival for the CEO and the editor is shown in Exhibit I. For both executives, 
the survival of the newspaper (measured in terms of age) increases as a function of number of 
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exits, but the nature of the relationship varies. The curve is much steeper for the CEO than for 
the editor, indicating that organizational survival (measured by age) increases much faster for 
the CEO than the editor as the total number of successions increases. This indicates that the 
net benefits of changing the CEO are greater than that of replacing the editor as firm 
performance declines, supporting the common sense notion that the actions and decisions of 
the CEO who is responsible to formulate and implement overall strategies are far more 
important to the firm than those of the next management level. 
The relationship between performance and executive tenure is lognormal, indicating 
that as performance deteriorates, executive tenure decreases at a lower rate. The shape of this 
relationship is convex as shown graphically in Exhibit 2. In other words, the "frictions" for 
dismissing the executive appear to increase as performance worsens. We interpret these 
findings as evidence that managerial entrenchment increases as the probability of 
organizational failure increases, suppol1ing Hypothesis 3a. 
In support of hypothesis 3b, Exhibit 2 shows that while the relationship between 
executive tenure and performance is convex for both CEO and editor, the editor is less likely 
to successfulIy engage in entrenchment practices because the tenure of this person is always 
substantially below that of the CEO even when performance (measured by the probability of 
failure) is at its worst. In fact, when the probability of failure is 100% (right hand corner of 
Exhibit 2) the CEO remains on the job for 7 years while the editor remains on the job for 2 
years. In light of the fact that the positive impact of managerial succession on organizational 
survival (measured by age) is much greater for the CEO than the editor (as per Exhibit 1 and 
our discussion above) these results suggest that managerial entrenchment may be partly 
responsible for shorter organizational survival. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
The results presented here indicate that monitoring mechanisms operate differently 
when there is a relational contract between the executive and the firm. This is evidenced by 
the fact that the CEO who has family ties to the principal is less subject to disciplining by the 
principal in the face of declining performance than the next executive (i.e., the editor). An 
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alternative, albeit complementary interpretation is that the presence of a relational contract 
facilitates top executive entrenchment to the detriment of the principal. In other words, the 
executive can take advantage of the principal under a relational contract by decoupling 
employment risk (i.e., being replaced) from observed performance outcomes. There are 
several reasons that support this interpretation. First, the CEO is less likely to be terminated 
than the editor as firm performance declines. This means that the editor somehow gets blamed 
for poor performance results and gets replaced accordingly. The CEO, on the other hand, can 
insulate himself/herself from downward performance pressures much better than the editor. In 
a sense, the editor becomes the scapegoat for poor results. Second, CEO replacements have a 
much greater positive effect on survival than editor changes. Therefore, while the editor has 
less influence over the factors that influence finn performance, he/she is still held more 
accountable for performance results than the CEO whose activities and decisions are more 
pivotal to organizational performance. This seeming contradiction can only be understood 
from a CEO entrenchment perspective. Third, the editor is likely to be terminated for poor 
performance results over which he has less control than the CEO regardless offamily ties to 
the CEO. This means that a relational contract protects the CEO, who has more power than 
the editor, but does little to help the editor in the face of poor performance. Finally, the 
convex relationship between executive tenure and the probability offirm failure indicates that 
many executives are able to hold onto their jobs even as the eventual firm's demise becomes 
clearer and clearer. For instance, the CEO can hold onto his/her job more than three times 
longer than the editor as the expected probability of business failure approaches 100%. 
Our interpretation of the above findings is consistent with prior research by Boeker 
(1992) who found that the powerful CEOs were able to deflect scapegoating and pass it on to 
their fellow executives. In a recent book, Finkelstein and Hambrick (1996: 202) expand on 
Boeker's preliminary empirical results" ... [ executive] departure reflects power. .. Boeker 
did not examine which specific executives were dismissed, but we could reasonably expect 
that their individual power would be highly predictive of their own retention versus 
departure." They go on the advance the following proposition, which we empirically support 
in this study: "the greater the executive's power within a top management group, the less 
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likely he or she is to be dismissed when the firm is performing poorly" (Finkelstein & 
Hambrick, 1996: 202). 
The research reported here does not support the notion that changes at the top of the 
organization make little difference nor that execLltive sLlccession tends to precipitate 
organizational failure. We find exactly the opposite, more in line with the agency argument 
that disciplining managers (though dismissal in the case of poor performance) enhances 
organizational survival. It is important to note that the sample used here fully adheres to an 
ecological context in which failure can occur relatively easy. Most newspapers are small, with 
limited resources and "slack", operating in a very competitive environment with few entry 
barriers, and sold in a relatively poor European country with one of the lowest percentages of 
the population that regularly reads a newspaper. Therefore, if top executive changes were to 
precipitate organizational m0l1ality, our sample provides a rather favorable context to observe 
this effect, yet we find that the reverse is true. 
Our findings are consistent with those of Singh et al. (1986) who found that among 
voluntary agencies organizational changes are associated with a lower death rate. Singh et al. 
(I986: 610), however, raised an important question which their study could not answer: "the 
adaptive or descriptive consequence of change found in this study may simply be statistical 
accidents (type I errors) rather than consequences of systematic organizational processes. 
Changes that are 'lucky' seem in retrospect, adaptive, and 'unlucky' changes seem disruptive. 
Such a random variation view may well be correct but we think that the question is an 
empirical one." It would be very difficult to reconcile our results with a random "lucky" or 
"unlucky" event explanation. Clearly, the weight of the evidence is more congruent with an 
agency interpretation in that when firms discipline executives (i.e., dismissal) they do so for 
good reasons (i.e., poor performance) and these changes tend to enhance organizational 
survival. 
Our findings agrees with those of Have man (I 993: 869) in that the effect of succession 
on organizational survival is stronger for presidents (i.e., CEO) than for other managers (i.e., 
editor) "consonant with the expectation that the behavior of the most powerful individual has 
the greatest effect on organizational outcomes." Yet, contrary to Haveman, our models show 
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a positive rather than a negative impact of organizational succession on performance. 
Haveman also found that the negative effect of succession on organizational survival 
diminishes overtime so that the impact is stronger immediately following a succession event. 
In the present study, we found a positive impact either immediately following each succession 
event or for the total number of cummulative successions overtime. 
Clearly, much research needs to be done on these issues given the conflicting results 
reported in the literature. Perhaps, the salutary or negative effects of executive succession on 
organizational mortality may be peculiar to each organizational population. Their effects may 
be more disruptive in other populations such as those used by Haveman ( 1993), Carroll 
(1984) and Amburgey, Kelly, and Barnett (1993). Yet our results seem to fit nicely with 
agency predictions in that monitoring (reflected in the performance - executive tenure 
relations) is beneficial to the principal and that if given an opportunity executives will entrench 
themselves, avoiding full accountability for their actions. This suggests that in the absence of 
good information principals may be better off attributing poor organizational performance to 
managers for the reasons noted by Walsh and Seward (I 990) in their review of the literature: 
(a) the principal may reason that it is the manager'sjob to guide the firm to success in any 
environment, no matter how constraining; (b) it is very ditftcult to sOl1 out the effect of an 
uncertain/challenging environment from managerial incompetence and (c) the principal has the 
ability to make changes in management, even though altering the environment is ditftcult. 
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Variables 
Total Number of Ncwspapers 
Age al time of failure 
CEO Tenure 
Editor Tenure 
Relational Tie eEO-Editor 
Probability of Failurc for CEO 
P'robsbility of Failure for Editc~ 
Age at lime of CEO Succession 
Age al time of Editor Succession 
Firms born before 1966 
Part)' Affiliation 
DensilY 
Own Printing Prcss 
Upil:l1 Structure 
TABLE 1 
POPULATION CHARACITRlSTICS 
TABLE 2 
Number 
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609 
899 
40 
31~ 
':26 
609 
899 
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42 
276 
110 
13:> 
Frequency Distribution of Managerial Succession Events 
Variables Number of Succcssions 
Frequency 0 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
CEO 237 155 105 56 25 14 10 7 0 
Editor 264 181 138 108 80 55 33 19 10 
Total 
9 10 
0 0 609 
6 5 899 
TABLE 3 
Mean3, Standard Deviations, and Correlations for Tenure 
CflfEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER EDITOR 
Variab!c ,"leans ~ d. 2 J 4 5 G Mcall~ s.d. ~ J ~ 5 
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Own Printing Press 0.79 0.40 -DO 1 0.42 0.58 0.27 0.80 0.39 -D.05 0.4 J 0.61 0.28 
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TA.BLE 5 
r::FFECT OF I'ERFOR"'1t,NCE AND RELATIONAL TIES ON TENUHE 
COIlS:;llIl 
(i,.:rt'url1l:ln;;c 
l{d.III\)I\:d TI(;) \ P,r:c.lnn3!1Ce 
I\~I: il\ SlICC(;SSII)Il 
Fifln~ b0rn b..:t'or, 1 '166 
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·096'" • 
0.40 
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EDITOR 
0.36 
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0,0 I" 
·0,) 8 
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CEO-EDITOR FAMILY TIES 
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-0.3 5' • • • 
00 I' 
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TABLE 6 
Efl'e:ct of SUCCt!ssion on Organizational Failure 
~. ~ .. climp EX T,'CU1 '\VF Or.r.ICER EDITOR 
'I O\~I lU\ill Individual Individual TOlal TOlal Individual Individual 
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